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Abstract
This paper provides a simple political agency model to explain the eﬀect
of political alignment between diﬀerent tiers of government on intergovern-
mental grants and election outcomes. Key features of the model are: (i)
rational voters interpret public good provision as a signal of incumbent com-
petence, and (ii) realistically, grants are unobservable to voters. In this
setting, the national government will use the grant as an instrument to ma-
nipulate the public good signal for the benefit of aligned local incumbents
and challengers. Then, aligned municipalities receive more grants, with this
eﬀect being stronger before elections, and the probability that the aligned
local incumbent is re-elected is higher. These predictions are tested using a
regression discontinuity design on a new data-set on Italian municipalities.
At a second empirical stage, the national grant to municipalities is instru-
mented with an alignment indicator, allowing estimation of a flypaper eﬀect
for Italian municipalities.
Keywords: Fiscal Federalism, Political Competition, Accountability,
Flypaper eﬀect
∗Corresponding author at: Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry
CV4 7AL, UK. Tel. +44 (0) 24 765 23032. Email: Michela.Redoano@warwick.ac.uk
Preprint submitted to Journal of Public Economics October 27, 2014
JEL CLASSIFICATION: H2, H77, H87, D7
1. Introduction
This paper makes two contributions. First, it presents a new theory of
discretionary inter-governmental grants, based on a principal-agent model
of multi-level government with political parties. In this theory, grants are
signals, rather than bribes, as in standard political economy theory of grants
(Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1995, 1998). Specifically,
a higher grant raises local public good provision, and the latter signals a
higher local incumbent ability to the electorate. Assuming that central gov-
ernment cares about the electoral fortunes of politically aligned incumbents,
this provides an incentive for the center to donate to districts with aligned
incumbents1. By doing so, the center boosts the signal for the aligned in-
cumbents, thus increasing their probability of re-election. For non-aligned
districts, the eﬀect works in reverse; a lower grant weakens the quality sig-
nal for the non-aligned incumbent, thus boosting the electoral chances of
the challenger. This theory extends recent studies of the eﬀects of grants
on the behavior of rent-seeking politicians, notably Brollo et. al. (2013),
by introducing an upper level of government and endogenizing the choice of
grant.
Second, we develop and test a number of empirical predictions of our
theory. The first prediction is of course, an alignment eﬀect in grants. The
second, which is new, is that a higher grant increases the probability of
incumbent re-election, so that there is an alignment eﬀect on incumbency
advantage. Third, we predict that the alignment eﬀect is stronger in election
years than in non-election years. We also predict that conditional on grants,
(i) local spending and taxes are independent of alignment, and (ii) there
is a flypaper eﬀect i.e. a one dollar increase in the grants has a bigger
positive eﬀect on local government spending than does an equivalent rise in
private income. These last two predictions suggest that the flypaper eﬀect
can be identified by instrumenting grants by the alignment status of the local
government.
1This result is not new; Arulampalam et al. (2009) have the same finding in a distribu-
tive politics model where a national government can “buy” support from swing voters for
aligned local incumbents. What is new is that our result is established in a micro-founded
political agency model, where the mechanism at work can be identified.
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We then take these predictions to an original data-set on Italian mayoral
elections and public finance for the period 1998-2010.2 Italy is a good labo-
ratory to test our hypotheses, as in Italy, grants from central government to
municipalities have a large discretionary element, unlike most other OECD
countries3. Our dataset includes almost 500 municipalities between 1998 and
2010, who depend on largely discretionary grants from central governments
to fund around 25% of their expenditure. Moreover in the period covered
by our data-set, the incumbent party at the central level has changed three
times (in 2001, 2006 and 2008), and each year local elections were held in
a number of municipalities. This gives us the variation in alignment that is
needed to test our theory.
We use a regression discontinuity design to identify the alignment eﬀects
on grants and incumbent advantage.4 Specifically, we compare municipali-
ties where the elected mayor is just aligned with central governments with
ones where the mayor is just unaligned, where “just aligned” means that
the mayor won the election with a small margin and that the mayor and
the central government belong to the same party. Using this design, we find
highly significant alignment eﬀects that are robust across a number of dif-
ferent specifications, for both grants and incumbency. If a municipality is
politically aligned with the party in power at the central level, it will be re-
warded with on average, 40% more grants than unaligned municipalities. The
probability that the aligned incumbent mayor (or his coalition) is re-elected
in the election is, on average, 30% higher than in non-aligned ones. More-
over, this alignment eﬀect is stronger in the run-up to municipal elections
than afterwards, in line with the theory.
The first empirical results tell us that alignment is potentially an appro-
2Data of Italian mayoral elections are taken for the period 1998-2008, therefore for the
last two years we included in the sample only municipalities that did not have elections.
3Formula grants are extensively adopted, for example, in: Australia (82% of total grants
to local government), Austria (98%), Denmark (97%), Portugal (85%), France (95%),
United Kingdom. Discretionary ones are highly employed, for example, in Australia (at
state level 90%), Czech Republic (88%), Turkey (100%). Data are our calculations from
OECD Revenue Statistics, 2005 edition.
4The advantage of this design is that it overcomes a fundamental identification
problem—the potential correlation between fiscal choices and the ideological character-
istics of its voters—to identify the alignment eﬀect on tax setting, grant allocation and
public spending. A similar approach, in the context of grant allocation only, has been
used in independent works by Brollo and Nannicini (2012) and Migueis (2013).
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priate instrument to use in testing the eﬀect of the grant on local expenditure
and tax revenues. So, we test the eﬀect of alignment on these variables5,
instrumenting the grant by an alignment dummy and also the margin of
alignment. The IV estimates indicate the presence of a flypaper eﬀect. First,
public spending increases by about 0.4 Euros per capita for each Euro in-
crease in grants. On the other hand, a Euro increase in private income has a
negligible eﬀect on public spending. So, the overall flypaper eﬀect is around
0.4, in line with the results surveyed in Inman (2008).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related
literature. Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework, and Section 4
presents the main theoretical results. Section 5 presents some background
information on Italy, data description and the econometric strategy. Sections
6 discuss the main empirical results on transfers and incumbents and Section
8 is devoted to the flypaper eﬀect. Section 9 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Our work speaks to at least four related literatures. First, on the the-
oretical side, our paper develops a new political economy theory of inter-
governmental transfers based on a principal-agent model of multi-level gov-
ernment. This extends the existing literature in two ways. First, there is
now a huge literature on political agency (summarized in for example, Pers-
son and Tabellini, 2002; Besley, 2007), which stresses the role of elections
in screening and monitoring politicians. However, this literature focusses on
one level of government, and has hardly considered intergovernmental grants.
One exception is Brollo et al. (2013), which shows how higher grants from
central governments can have negative eﬀects on the behavior of lower-level
governments in that the higher the transfer, the greater the rent taken by
the lower-level incumbent, and when entry of incumbents is endogenized, the
less good is incumbent quality. However, in that paper, grants are treated
as exogenous6. Our theoretical contribution is to endogenize the grant in a
5In the Online Appendix we propose two alternative exercise, where the dependent
variable is in turn (i) municipality expenditure net of (national and regional) grants, which
corresponds to the sum of local taxes and fees, (ii) the total amount of public expenditures.
The results for the estimation of the flypaper eﬀect are very similar and around 40%
6Bordignon et al. (2013) extend Brollo et al. (2013) to allow for two “quality” dimen-
sions of politicians. Richer municipalities (with larger tax bases) are more likely to attract
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setting very similar to Brollo et al. (2013). So, this paper is the first, to our
knowledge, to study intergovernmental grants in an agency framework.
Our approach is also in contrast to a “distributive politics” theory of in-
tergovernmental grants due originally to Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Dixit
and Londregan (1995), and extended to a fiscal federalism setting more re-
cently by Dixit and Londregan (1998) and Arulampalam et al. (2009)7. This
literature takes a Downsian view; parties can pre-commit to intergovern-
mental transfers prior to the election, and these transfers are observable by
voters, both strong assumptions. In Dixit and Londregan (1998), national
parties choose intergovernmental transfers to maximize their vote share in
the national election, taking into account any redistribution of these funds
amongst voter groups by state governments. They find that the transfer from
the center to a given state will be higher, the greater the average “clout” of
voting groups in that state, where “clout” depends on the relative number
of “swing” voters in that group, and how cheap those votes are to buy (the
weight that voters in the group put on consumption relative to ideology).
Arulampalam et al. (2009) modify the Dixit-Londregan set-up to allow
transfers from national government to impact directly on voters’ incomes,
and assume that national governments do not contest an election, but rather
design grants to maximize the vote share of the aligned local candidates.
Moreover, they assume that if the local and national incumbents are not
aligned, the “goodwill” or utility increment generated by the grant is shared
between the local incumbent and challenger (the latter being by definition,
aligned with the national incumbent, as there are only two parties). Specifi-
cally, it is assumed that the local incumbent gets a share θ of the goodwill,
and local challenger 1− θ. The qualitative predictions of the theory depend
crucially whether this share is greater than one half. This θ is simply taken as
exogenous in their theory, and indeed cannot be meaningfully endogenized in
their model. One contribution of our theoretical model is that it eﬀectively
endogenizes θ; see Section 4 below for more discussion.
On the empirical side, there are several related literatures. First, there
is the literature on political alignment eﬀects on intergovernmental grants.
There are a number of papers that establish, for various countries, that polit-
“productive” rather than “rent seeking” politicians. In their paper, rather than grants,
the exogenous variation is from the 1999 reform in Italy that gave municipalities the power
to set a surcharge on the income tax.
7See Johansson (1999) for an empirical test of the distributive politics theory.
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ical alignment with the center generates higher levels of discretionary grant
to the local government, for example, Levitt and Snyder (1995) and Larcinese
et al. (2006), for the US, Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) for Spain,
Arulampalam et al. (2009) for India, Case (2001) for Albania, Rodden and
Wilkinson (2004) for India, Brollo and Nannicini (2012) for Brazil, Migueis
(2013) for Portugal. In particular, our theoretical finding that alignment
eﬀects are stronger in election years is consistent with Brollo and Nannicini
(2012).
Second, there is a large literature on incumbency advantage. In partic-
ular, several recent papers use a regression discontinuity design in order to
estimate the advantage of incumbency in elections, relying on the fact that
when the electoral race is very tight, the identity of the winning party is likely
to be determined by pure chance. The main contributions include Lee (2001,
2008); Lee et al. (2004) and Ferreira and Gyourko (2009). The common
finding is that an incumbent policy maker enjoys a considerable advantage
in winning elections.8 Our approach diﬀers from the above because we are
not attempting to estimate the incumbent eﬀect as such, but we estimate
the eﬀect of alignment on incumbency, i.e. we estimate whether being just
aligned with the central government increases an incumbent mayor’s chance
of being re-elected compared with a just unaligned mayor.
Third, our paper also relates to the large empirical literature on the fly-
paper eﬀect (for surveys, see Hamilton, 1983 and Inman, 2008). One of the
main problems faced by this literature is that intergovernmental grants may
be endogenous, and thus unbiased estimates of the flypaper eﬀect require ei-
ther (i) identification of truly exogenous changes in intergovernmental grants
as in Dahlberg et al. (2008), or (ii) appropriate instruments for grants, as in
Knight (2002). Our work is a contribution to the second strand of the liter-
ature; we are the first, to our knowledge, to use alignment as an instrument
to estimate the flypaper eﬀect.
Finally our paper is related to Bracco and Brugnoli (2012) and Cioﬃ et al.
(2012); they both analyze Italian local public finance data to investigate the
eﬀect of political competition on policies. Bracco and Brugnoli (2012) focus
on the eﬀect mayoral electoral system on grant allocation and finds that
plurality elected mayors received less grants than colleagues elected under
8For example Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) find that, in the US, Democratic mayors
who barely win an election have about a 66% chance of winning the next election.
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dual ballot system. Cioﬃ et al. (2012) find evidence of a political cycle for
local capital expenditures in those municipalities where the mayors are not
politically aligned with the central government coalition.
3. A Theoretical Framework
3.1. The Environment
In a country there are two tiers of government: a central government,
and i = 1, ..n local jurisdictions, also referred to as municipalities. There
are two parties L and R, which operate both at the central and local level.
Without loss of generality, we assume that party L is ruling at the central
level and in a subsetMA of local authorities, while the complementary subset
of non-aligned municipalitiesMN are ruled by party R. The subscripts A and
N indicate that left-wing localities are aligned with the central government,
while right-wing ones are non-aligned.
In each of two periods t = 1, 2, the incumbent mayor in municipality
i produces a local public good via the following production function
gi,t = F (ri,t) exp(ei,t + ai,t), ri,t = τi,t + Ti,t (1)
where ei,t, ai,t are incumbent’s eﬀort and ability levels, τi,t is local tax revenue
(from a property or income tax) and Ti,t is a transfer from the central govern-
ment. So, ri,t is total fiscal resources of the municipality, and is also equal to
public expenditure. Also, we assume that F (ri,t) is non-negative, increasing
in ri,t, and concave. Then, under these assumptions, gi,t is non-negative.
Finally, the incumbent abilities ai,t are determined as follows. First, the
initial incumbent’s ability, ai,1 is drawn from a distribution with mean zero,
where the distribution is common knowledge between voters and the incum-
bent. If the initial incumbent retains oﬃce, his ability is the same in the
second period i.e. ai,2 = ai,1. If he loses oﬃce, ai,2 = ai,c, where ai,c is the
challenger’s ability, drawn from the same distribution as ai,1.
The order of events is as follows. In period 1, each incumbent mayor
chooses ei,1, τi,1, i = 1, . . . , n, and the national government chooses Ti,1, i =
1, . . . , n.. Then, gi,1 is determined via (1). Having observed gi,1, τi,1 but not
ei,1, Ti,1, the voters in region i vote in municipal elections for the incumbent
or the challenger. The winners take oﬃce in period 2 and choose ei,2, τi,2, i =
1, . . . , n. The national incumbent does not face an election and retains oﬃce,
and chooses Ti,2 , i = 1, . . . , n in period 2.
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3.2. Payoﬀs
In each municipality i, there are a large number (a continuum of measure
1) of identical voters who have utility
u(gi,t, ci,t) = ln gi,t + ci,t (2)
where ci,t is consumption of a private good. The private budget constraint
of voter j in municipality i at time t is ci,t = mj−d(τi,t) where mj is private
income, and d(τi,t) is the cost to the household of tax revenue τi,t..We assume
d(0) = 0, d￿, d￿￿ > 0, d(τ) > τ, τ > 0, so that d captures the sum of loss of
income and any of deadweight losses and compliance costs of taxation. This
specification is standard in the public finance literature (e.g. Bolton and
Roland, 1997).
Substituting the budget constraint into (2), and ignoring mj, we get a
voter payoﬀ over government policy of ln gi,t − d(τi,t). Moreover, following
Dixit and Londregan (1998), voter v in municipality i has an ideological
preference for the incumbent, measured negatively byXi. So, voter v’s overall
payoﬀ is
ln gi,t − d(τi,t)−Xi (3)
We assume Xi is distributed independently across voters and uniformly on
[−1/(2ζi), 1/(2ζi)], with ζi inversely measuring the dispersion of ideological
preferences in municipality i. So, ζi measures the strength of swing voting
i.e. the sensitivity of voting choices to performance in oﬃce in municipality
i.
The incumbent municipal politician is quasi-benevolent, i.e. cares about
voter utility from gi,t, τi,t, but also dislikes eﬀort and values the probability
of winning the election pi,t :
λ (ln gi,t − d(τi,t))− ψ(ei,t) + pi,tVi,t, λ > 0 (4)
Here, λ is the weight on voter welfare, and Here, ψ(.) is a twice diﬀerentiable,
strictly increasing and strictly convex cost of eﬀort. Moreover, Vi,t is the
continuation value of oﬃce for the incumbent, calculated at the point when
policy is chosen at time t. In period 2, by definition, pi,2 ≡ Vi,2 ≡ 0; it can
be shown (see the online Appendix) that Vi,1 = V for all municipalities, and
pi,1 is determined as described below. We assume, without loss of generality,
that V = 1, so the payoﬀ from re-election is measured solely by pi,1. Overall,
(4) is quite a standard objective for the politician (see for example Besley,
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2007).
The incumbent national politician is similarly quasi-benevolent, and also
(as in Arulampalam et al., 2009) cares about the re-election payoﬀs of incum-
bents in aligned jurisdictions, and challengers in non-aligned jurisdictions.
So, his payoﬀ is￿
i∈MA
pi,t +
￿
i∈MN
(1− pi,t) +
￿
i∈M
λ (ln gi,t − d(τi,t))−
￿
i∈M
Ti,t
whereM = MA∪MN is the set of all municipalities, and the cost of providing
Ti,t to a municipality i is normalized to unity. For simplicity, we assume a
discount factor of one for all agents.
3.3. Discussion
The basic structure of the model is very similar to that of Brollo et al.
(2013). The main diﬀerences are twofold. First, the details of the public
good production function and voter utility function are somewhat diﬀerent,
and second, more importantly, we endogenize the transfer Ti,t from central
government. Note that a crucial assumption is that Ti,t is not observed by the
voter at the time of voting; without this, grants could not be used to signal.
We believe that the assumption that Ti,t is not observed is very realistic; vot-
ers typically do not understand the complex rules governing formula grants,
much less understand how discretionary grants are allocated. Finally, note
that the assumption that the incumbent does not know his own ability at the
beginning of his term of oﬃce is a widely made one in the literature on po-
litical principal-agent models (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Alesina and
Tabellini, 2007); it keeps the analysis tractable while allowing the incumbent
to signal his ability via higher public expenditure in equilibrium.
4. Theoretical Results
We solve the model backwards. In the second period, voter payoﬀs are
increasing in incumbent ability. In fact, as shown in the online Appendix,
incumbents of all abilities choose the same levels of tax and eﬀort in the
second period, so that the diﬀerence in second period voter payoﬀs over
government policy between incumbents with abilities a, a￿ is just a− a￿. So,
because incumbent ability is persistent, the voter in i wishes to re-elect the
incumbent only if the diﬀerence between his expected first-period ability aei,1,
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and zero, the expected ability of the challenger, is higher than the voter’s
ideological preference for the challenger, measured by Xi. So, the voter will
re-elect the incumbent if
aei,1 ≥ Xi (5)
From now on, we drop time subscripts, as all relevant variables are first-
period. So, we see from (5) that the probability of the incumbent winning,
pi, is generally
pi = Pr (Xi ≤ aei ) = 0.5 + ζiaei (6)
How is aei determined? We can assume without loss of generality that the
voter makes his inference about ai by observing his utility from public good
provision, which is
ln gi = f(τi + Ti) + ei + ai, f = lnF (7)
Note that by the assumptions on F, f is strictly increasing and concave.9
Then, if the voter expects eﬀort and the transfer to be at levels eei , T
e
i , but
observes ln gi, his inferred value of aei must satisfy
ln gi = f(τi + T
e
i ) + e
e
i + a
e
i (8)
Then, combining (7), (8), we get
aei = f(τi + Ti) + ei − f(τi + T ei )− eei + ai (9)
That is, voter expectations are rational, up to any error in forecasting Ti, ei.
The incumbent politician in i perceives his probability of victory to be
the expectation of pi with respect to ai. Combining (6),(9), we see that this
is
pei = 0.5 + ζi (f(τi + Ti) + ei − f(τi + T ei )− eei )
9This functional form implies that eﬀort and tax revenue are independent in the sense
that ∂
2 ln g
∂τ∂e = 0. If the two inputs τ, e are complements i.e. this cross-partial is strictly
positive, Propositions 1, 3 and 4 would still hold. Proposition 2 instead would not, as—
conditional on grants—aligned mayor would exert less eﬀort and levy lower taxes.
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So, local government i chooses τi, ei to maximize
λ(f(τi + Ti) + ei − d(τi))− ψ(ei) + 0.5 + ζipei
taking Ti, T ei , e
e
i as given. The first-order conditions with respect to τi, ei are:
λ+ ζi = ψ
￿(ei), λf ￿(τi + Ti) + ζi (f ￿(τi + Ti)− f ￿(τi + T ei )) = λd￿(τi) (10)
respectively. In equilibrium, expectations are rational, i.e. T ei = Ti, e
e
i = ei.
So, (10) reduces to
λ+ ζi = ψ
￿(ei), f ￿(τi + Ti) = d￿(τi) (11)
The national government chooses Ti to maximize￿
i∈MA
ζip
e
i −
￿
i∈MN
ζip
e
i +
￿
i∈M
λ(f(τi + Ti) + ei − d(τi))−
￿
i∈M
Ti
taking τi, ei, T ei , e
e
i as given. By the same argument, at equilibrium, the first-
order conditions with respect to Ti are
(λ+ ζi)f
￿(τi + Ti) = 1, i ∈MA (12)
(λ− ζi)f ￿(τi + Ti) = 1, i ∈MN (13)
Collectively, these first-order conditions characterize any Nash equilib-
rium to the game between the central government and the n municipalities.
From these first-order conditions, we can then establish the following results,
all of which are proved in the Online Appendix.
Proposition 1. If i is aligned, and j is non-aligned, then Ti > Tj.
The intuition is as follows. First, national government has a baseline
incentive to give transfers, because it cares about voter welfare. This is
captured by the terms λf ￿ in (12)-(13). In addition, the national government
perceives that by raising Ti, there will be an unanticipated (by the voter)
increase in gi, and the incumbent will get the credit for this, raising the re-
election probability pi. So, the national government will want to give more
to aligned districts, and less to non-aligned ones. This is captured by the
term ζif ￿ in (12), and −ζif ￿ in (13).
We can now compare our results to Arulampalam et al. (2009). They
assume that with alignment, the “goodwill” or utility increase for the voter
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generated by the grant is all captured by the local incumbent, but with
non-alignment, it is shared between the local incumbent and challenger in
exogenous shares θ, 1−θ respectively. Their Proposition 1, one of their main
results, states that aligned incumbents get higher grants, independently of
voter responsiveness ζi when the share of credit going to the challenger,
θ < 0.5, because when this holds, a grant to a non-aligned municipality un-
ambiguously benefits the incumbent. In our micro-founded approach, build-
ing on well-known political economy models, we see that the non-aligned
incumbent gets all the credit i.e. θ = 1.
Finally, note that Proposition 1 is a result for election years. By contrast,
in the second period of the model, there are no alignment eﬀects i.e. transfers
to aligned and non-aligned municipalities are the same. So, generally, our
empirical prediction is that alignment eﬀects will be stronger in election years.
The absence of an alignment eﬀect in non-election years is an artefact of the
simplicity of the model and such an eﬀect could easily be introduced in a
number of ways e.g. by supposing that the national government cares more
about voter welfare in the aligned municipalities.
The second result says that alignment eﬀects on local taxes and spending
only work through transfers.
Proposition 2. Conditional on transfers, local tax revenue τi and spending
ri = τi + Ti are independent of alignment.
The proof of this is obvious from (11). Writing the relevant conditions
out in full, for any municipality i, we have:
f ￿(τi + Ti) = d￿(τi) (14)
So, τi is independent of ei, which does depend directly on alignment. It then
follows directly from (14) that tax revenue and expenditure only depend on
alignment via transfers. We can now be more precise about how transfers
aﬀect local taxes and spending:
Proposition 3. A given increase in transfers will reduce taxes by less than
the change in the transfer i.e.
dτi
dTi
= − frr
frr − d￿￿ > −1
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and thus increase expenditures by
dri
dTi
= 1− frr
frr − d￿￿ > 0
The intuition for this result is that as the transfer Ti rises, the marginal
deadweight loss of taxation falls, encouraging the municipality to raise more
revenue overall, and thus τi does not fall one-for-one with Ti.
This result leads to a prediction about the flypaper eﬀect in our model.
The flypaper eﬀect is usually understood to be the stylized fact that grants
have a bigger positive eﬀect on local government spending than does an
equivalent rise in private income (Inman, 2008). In our setting, households
preferences are linear in income (see (2)), so there is no private income eﬀect
on government spending. However, we see from Proposition 3 that dridTi > 0,
so our model predicts a flypaper eﬀect of transfers. Moreover, these results
suggest a way of identifying the flypaper eﬀect via the use of alignment as
an instrument, as discussed in Section 8 below.
Finally, we ask how the alignment eﬀect described in Proposition 1 im-
pacts upon the fortunes of the incumbent in an election. We have seen that
higher transfers from the center lead to greater public good provision, and
one might expect that might help the incumbent win the election. It turns
out that if all voters are fully rational, that is not the case; rational voters
“see through” the higher gi,t because they rationally anticipate that aligned
incumbents get higher transfers.
However, it seems implausible that all voters behave like that; after all,
the retrospective voting literature demonstrates empirically that good per-
formance is rewarded (see for example Fiorina, 1978; Wolfers, 2002). This
can be formalized in our model by assuming that there is a fraction 1− β of
the voters who are “naive retrospective” i.e. they are more likely to re-elect
the incumbent if they see that gi,1 was higher (or equivalently, they received
a higher utility ln gi,1 − d(τi,1) in period 1). This can be contrasted with
the “sophisticated retrospective” behavior of the fully rational voters in our
model, who are more likely to re-elect the incumbent if they believe that
ai was higher.10 Assume in particular that naive retrospective voter v votes
10A similar result might be obtained with a multi-period model with solely forward-
looking voters. In such a model all voters would be more likely to vote for the aligned
incumbent, as long as aligned jurisdictions kept on oﬀering more public good for less tax.
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for the incumbent if ln gi,1 − d(τi,1) ≥ Xi, where Xi is distributed uniformly
on [−1/(2ζi), 1/(2ζi)], as for the rational voters. It is then straightforward to
show that:
Proposition 4. Assume that municipality i is aligned, and j is not. If some
fraction β > 0 of voters are naive retrospective, and ζi ≥ ζj, the incumbent
is more likely to be re-elected in i than in j.
The intuition is simply that when voters are weakly more responsive in the
aligned jurisdiction (ζi ≥ ζj), alignment weakly increases eﬀort and strictly
increases expenditure on the public good, thus increasing the level of the
public good itself, and this increases the attractiveness of the incumbent for
the naive retrospective voters.
5. Empirical Analysis
5.1. Background Information on Italy
In this section we present some relevant background information on the
Italian electoral system and local public finance.
5.1.1. Tiers of governments, elections and parties
Italy is a unitary parliamentary republic with three sub-national levels:
regions (regioni), provinces (province), and municipalities (comuni); the lat-
ter are the subject of our analysis. Comuni are ruled by a city council
(consiglio comunale), and an executive committee (giunta), headed by an
elected mayor (sindaco). Mayors are in charge of appointing the members
of the giunta, to which tasks are delegated, including land management and
environment (water, sewage, public hygiene), local transport, local police,
culture and recreation, education (nursery schools, complementary educa-
tion services such as transport and meal services). Mayors also have some
revenue-raising powers, further described below.
Following a political reform that took place in 1992, mayors are directly
elected for five-year terms11 and are subject to a two-term limit. Mayors
Nevertheless, the model would be substantially more complicated than the current one,
as one would need to include further assumptions as to what extent voters are forward
looking, how much “memory” the serially-correlated ability ait has; it would also require
the formalization of upper-tier elections.
11Four years if elected before year 2000.
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and city council are elected together, with diﬀerent rules applying to mu-
nicipalities below or above the 15,000-inhabitant threshold (from now on
referred to as small and large municipalities). Mayors of small municipal-
ities are elected by first-past-the-post, while mayors of large municipalities
are elected by runoﬀ. This means that if no mayoral candidate obtains an
absolute majority, voters vote again on just two candidates, the winner and
the runner-up of the first round.
Generally speaking, in our sample period the political system was dom-
inated, both at the local and at the national level, by two large electoral
cartels, the center-right and the center-left. At the national level, the center-
right coalition ruled Italy from 2001 to 2006 and again from 2008 to 2011.
The center-left coalition, going from Communist parties to left-leaning Chris-
tian Democrats, ruled instead from 1996 to 2001, and then again from 2006
until 2008.
However, the two-tier electoral system means that the electoral cartels
are less influential in the smaller municipalities. Specifically, in smaller mu-
nicipalities, because of the first-past-the post system, there is less incentive
for small parties and independents to form coalitions to support a single can-
didate, whereas in the larger municipalities, there is a strong incentive to
field a candidate who can win at the first round. Coalitions, when they form,
are usually easy to classify as left or right, because they usually aﬃliate with
a national party. This means that the party of both the winning mayor and
the other contestants in the election is much easier to classify as “left” or
“right” in large municipalities.
This is shown in Table 1, which shows the type of party (or coalition
of parties) of the winning mayors in all municipal elections from 1998 to
2008, using oﬃcial data published by the Interior Ministry. Parties were
classified as left or right, using the classification in Table AA4 of the Online
Appendix. However, some could not be classified, for example, the lista
civica. Table 1 indicates that for large municipalities, only a small fraction
of the winners, about 5%, could not be classified as left or right. However, in
the case of small municipalities, the reverse is true, and most of the winners,
around 66%, could not be classified. Our study of alignment eﬀects requires
accurate identification of the party type (left or right). For this reason, we
do not include the small municipalities in our data-set.
Insert Table 1 about here
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5.1.2. Local Public Finance
Municipality expenditures are primarily in the areas of land management
and environment (waste disposal, water, sewage, public hygiene), social ser-
vices, education (schools, complementary education services), local trans-
port, local police, culture and recreation. Municipalities’ revenues come from
two main sources: transfers from upper levels of government (mainly the
central government) and own revenues (from own taxes and fees).12
The main source of own revenue for Italian municipalities is a property
tax, called ICI (Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili),13 introduced in 1992
and applied to real estate; the tax base is represented by the land registry
income and mayors are free to set the tax rate within a given range (0.4%
and 0.7% of income). Other important sources of own revenue are from the
taxation of personal income, through the national income-tax surcharge, a
waste disposal tax (TARSU), and fees (for example on the issue of parking
permits and certificates, related to the occupation of public spaces and areas,
on the use of public billboards).
Most of the remaining fiscal needs, about 30% of expenditure, are covered
by intergovernmental grants (mainly unconditional) from the central govern-
ment. It is important to note that these grants are not formula based. Every
year, a Budget Bill determines the grant going to municipalities as a whole,
and how it is distributed across municipalities. In practice, this involves a
common percentage change (often negative in the last few years) for all mu-
nicipalities, with an additional ad-hoc element, which is more likely to follow
political, rather than eﬃciency and equity criteria. Indeed, the need for a
radical reform of the whole grant allocation system towards a formula-based
one has been widely recognized by Italian legislators14.
12The use of debt is strongly restricted by the so-called “Internal Stability and Growth
Pact”, through which the central government limits the possibility of local authorities to
incur debts, in order to comply with the EU constraints on deficit and debt. Moreover,
the Art.119 of the Italian Constitution states that local governments can use debt financ-
ing only to cover capital expenditures. Therefore, as our analysis is focused on current
expenditures, we abstract from considering the debt as an active source of financing.
13The property tax changed name, after a reform, in 2012 becoming IMU (Imposta
Municipale propria).
14For example the national law n.42/2009 establishes the need to put in place a mech-
anism for the aggregation of the necessary parameters to calculate standard expenditure
needs. The aim of the reform, which is currently being implemented, is to replace the old
discretionary regime with a formula-based one.
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5.2. Data Description
Our data set comprises financial, census, and election data at the munic-
ipal level from 1998 to 201015. As described above, we restrict the analysis
to large comuni. This leaves us with a sample of 526 local councils and 4086
observations.16 Note also that, despite the fact the large municipalities only
constitute about 10% in terms of number of comuni, over 60% of the popu-
lation reside in large municipalities, which receive (depending on the year)
between 64% and 71% of total central government transfers; detailed figures
on grant allocation and population by municipality size are reported in Table
AA5 of the Online Appendix.
Local elections take place in each municipality every five years, but not
all at the same time. The large number of municipalities means that local
elections occur every year in our sample. On the other hand, national elec-
tions have been held in 2001, 2006 and 2008, and at every national election,
there has been a change in the ruling government coalition (from left to right
in 2001 and from right to left in 2006, and again form left to right in 2008).
Figure 1 visualizes the distribution of local governments by winning coalition
for each year of the sample period. The figure is divided into four panels; the
first and the third correspond to periods when the center-left coalition was
in power at the national level, and second and the fourth correspond to the
years dominated by a center-right national government.
Insert Figure 1 about here
In our regression discontinuity design (RDD) setting, our treatment is
the political alignment with the central government. For this purpose we
define the alignment variable, AL, equal to 1 if the mayor’s party-coalition
is the same as the coalition in power at the central level. Table 2 presents
information on the number of elections by year and by winning coalition
for aligned and non-aligned governments. It is interesting to note that the
sample is equally split between aligned and non-aligned municipalities.
Insert Table 2 about here
15The dataset comprises electoral data from 1998 to 2008 and fiscal data and controls
from 1998 to 2010.
16This is the number of observations for which we observe no missing values for all
variables of our dataset.
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Next, we construct our assignment variable for the RDD regressions, the
margin of alignment, MA. This is defined as the diﬀerence between the
percentage of votes obtained by the winning mayor and the percentage of
votes obtained by the runner-up if the winner is aligned with the center, and
minus this diﬀerence if the mayor is not aligned. If the mayor is elected in
the first round (because he or she got an absolute majority), the first-round
results are used, if a second round is held, then second-round results are used
instead, (Table AA6 in the Online Appendix reports detailed information
on first and second round elections). These political indicators have been
collected from the Statistical Oﬃce of the Italian Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs.
Table 3 shows the distributions of observations between aligned and non
aligned local governments and breaks down the figures by the margin of align-
ment. Overall we have 4759 observations, but, if we consider only elections
close to treatment thresholds, namely with a value ofMA less than either 5%
and 2%, the number of observations reduces drastically to 536 and 221 re-
spectively; however the proportion of aligned and non-aligned municipalities
remains virtually unchanged. Tables AA7 and AA8 of the Online Appendix
report disaggregated information on the number of elections held in each year
by winning coalition and alignment status.
Insert Table 3 about here
Our main dependent variables are: (i) current transfers from the central
government to municipalities and (ii) local tax revenue. We focus on current
expenditures and transfers because they are more likely to track the yearly
decisions of central governments at any point in time, unlike investment
expenditures, which tend to be set for longer periods of time. All these
variables are expressed in real per capita values and data are taken from
the Italian Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs. In particular, current transfers from
the central government to municipalities are the item “trasferimenti correnti
dallo Stato” in the municipality balance sheet.
Moreover, we employ a set of other controls which are generally thought
to aﬀect local public finance outcomes. First, we include variables measuring
socio-demographic and geographical characteristics of municipalities, com-
prising resident population, proportion of population less than 14 and over
65 years old (the source of these variables is the Italian Institute of National
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Statistics (ISTAT)). Second, we include economic variables, comprising in-
come per capita from real estate and from other sources. The sources for
these variables are the Ministry of Finance the Ministry of Interior.
Third, we include other political controls. First, we have dummies record-
ing whether the incumbent mayor (or party) has been re-elected, if the mayor
is elected at the second round, and if the municipality is aligned with the
regional government. Moreover we also include dummies for political orien-
tation both at the local and national level (the former equal to one if the
mayor is supported by a center-left coalition and that latter equal to one if a
center-left government is in power at the national level). Finally, we include
an electoral cycle variable that records the number of years since the last
local election. The sources for these variables are the Ministry of Interior.
Descriptive statistics for all the variables employed in the regressions are
given in Table 4; figures refer to statistics for the full sample as well as for
restricted samples, i.e. for local governments that are close to the treatment
threshold, namely within a MA of five and two percentage points.
Insert Table 4 about here
Looking at average per capita data for the full sample we can see that
comuni’s current public expenditures amount to 790 Euros per capita, 20%
of which is funded by grants from the central government. Figures for the
restricted versions of the data set (MA < 5%, MA < 2%) are similar.
Looking at our main controls, the values of the standard deviations suggest
that there is a lot of variation within each variable included in the data set
but the sample means for the three samples are similar.
As a further description of the data, Table AA3 of the Online Appendix
presents summary statistics for aligned and non-aligned local governments.
We can observe that, municipalities aligned with the central government
coalition significantly enjoy more grants from the central government (177.42
and 132.50 Euros per capita), and raise lower taxes (236.88 and 250.85).
Finally, note that our samples are almost equally split between aligned and
unaligned municipalities, which is the treatment variable we are interested
in for the purposes of our analysis.
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6. Alignment and Transfers
6.1. Estimation Strategy
In this section we test the prediction of Proposition 1 on the eﬀect of
alignment on grant allocation. As already discussed, we compare municipali-
ties where the elected mayor is barely aligned with central governments with
those where the mayor is barely unaligned, where “barely aligned” means
that the mayor won the election with a tight margin and that the mayor and
the central government belong to the same party. Lee (2001, 2008) show that
this approach represents quasi-random variation in party winners, because—
as long as there are some unpredictability in voting behavior—when the race
is very tight, the identity of the winning party is likely to be determined by
pure chance.
There are various ways in which RDD can be implemented using both
parametric and non parametric analyses; see Lee and Lemieux (2010) for an
excellent survey. The simplest approach is to compare policy outcomes just
around the treatment threshold; however this method can produce imprecise
estimates and has to rely on a large sample size. Given the relatively limited
number of observations available to us around the treatment threshold, our
preferred strategy is to use an alternative approach which is based on the use
of all available data together with a control function. This approach consists
on regressing the dependent variable on a pth-order polynomial in the control
function, in addition to the binary treatment indicator.
The model we estimate takes the following form:
lnTi,t = γ0ALi,t + f(MAi,t;ALi,t) + β
￿Xi,t + ςt + µi + vi,t (15)
where Ti,t is the per capita grant to municipality i at time t, and ALi,t is our
alignment dummy that takes value of one if the ruling party at the local level
in municipality i is the same as the party in power at the central level; this
is our treatment variable. Finally, MAi,t, the margin of alignment, already
defined above, is our assignment variable. Recall that all observations with
a positive (negative) MAi,t are municipalities which are aligned (unaligned)
with the central government, and observations with a smallMAi,t in absolute
value refer to mayors who won the elections with a very small margin.17
17It is important to emphasize that both the alignment dummy and the assignment
variable refer to the previous year’s observation. This is due to the fact that, in the
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We allow f(MAi,t;ALi,t) to be a pth order polynomial in MAi,t, with
coeﬃcients all interacted with ALi,t.18 Finally Xi,t is a vector of control vari-
ables, ςt is a year dummy, and µi is the unobserved heterogeneity. We treat
µi as a municipality fixed eﬀect. The coeﬃcient of interest is γ0, which is
our alignment eﬀect at the zero threshold, and, following Proposition 1, its
expected sign is positive.
As pointed out by Imbens and Lemieux (2008), the above estimation
method may be sensitive to outcome values for observations far away from
the threshold. To address this issue, as a robustness check, we also im-
plement the local linear regression approach, which restricts the sample to
municipalities in the interval MAi,t ∈ [−h,+h], where h is an optimally cho-
sen bandwidth, here selected following the methodology suggested by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012).
6.2. Graphical Analysis
We begin with a graphical approach to make the main point clearly.
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the margin of alignment, MA, on the horizontal
axis, and the per capita grant allocated to each municipality on the vertical
axis. Figure 2(a) reports the fitted values from a running-mean smoothing
of per capita grants fitted over the interval [-40, +40] in the MA, performed
separately on each side of the cutoﬀ point, as well as the 95% confidence
intervals. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010) we include 50 bins in all figures.
Figure 2(b) reports graphical representation of the local linear regression
model of per capita grants in the MA fitted over the optimal bandwidth.
Insert Figure 2 about here
The figures show quite clearly that there is a discontinuity in the distri-
bution of grants between aligned and unaligned municipalities at MA = 0.
Figure 2(a) also shows that grants tend to rise with the margin of alignment,
even away from the zero threshold.
sample, local and central elections have been held always between April and June, while
the allocation of grants is decided by the central government by the end of December and
the local fiscal policy is decided by local councils usually not later than March.
18That is, our control function is: f = β01MAit + β02MA2it + ... + β0pMA
p
it +
β1ALitMAit + β2ALitMA2it + ...+ βpALitMA
p.
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6.3. Regression Results
The results of regression (15) are displayed in Table 5. As the dependent
variable is the log of the per capita grant, the coeﬃcient γ0 in equation (15)
has the interpretation of the percentage change in per capita transfer due to
the alignment eﬀect.19 In all our specifications standard errors are clustered
at municipal level.
The table is divided into three panels. In the first panel we display
results for the so-called OLS regression model (which corresponds to equation
(15) in the case of zero-order polynomial in the control function). In the
second panel we report the estimated γ0 in equation (15) considering the
optimal polynomial order in the control function (according to tests reported
in Table A1, the optimal polynomial order is the the 4th). The coeﬃcients’
point estimates obtained considering all polynomial orders are displayed in
Table AA1 of the Online Appendix. We produce two sets of results, the
first one generated by employing the full RDD sample, and the second one
by restricting the sample to those municipalities whose mayor was elected
in the second round. By doing so we address a possible concern on the
robustness of our results due to the fact that MA is calculated in the same
way (i.e. as the percentage diﬀerence in the votes between the winner and
the runner up) for elections where the mayor is elected in the first round and
for those decided in a second round.20
Finally, in the bottom panel we report the results for the local linear
regression model, where the sample is restricted to observations within an
optimally chosen bandwidth, calculated following Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012), using the full RDD sample. As a robustness checks we also present
results for when the sample is restricted to double as well as half the optimal
bandwidth size.
For each specification we propose three variations. In the first column,
19In a previous working paper version of this paper Bracco et al. (2013) we present
results when the variables are in level, which are qualitatively similar.
20Recall that second-round elections are, by definition, elections with only two candi-
dates, while in first round elections the number of candidates may vary. Second, the fact
that a candidate obtains the majority of the votes in the first round can itself be inter-
preted as a sign of high popularity (or, in other words, low political competition in that
municipality).This is clearly confirmed by looking at the summary statistics for the first
round election dummy reported in Table 4. Taking the full sample, 44% of elections are
decided in the second round, but if we look only at close races (i.e. MA less than 5%), the
proportion of second round elections goes up to 90%.
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we run the regressions without additional controls, in the second one we
include the full set of controls listed in Table 4 as well as year dummies, in
the third column we also include a municipality fixed eﬀect. As pointed out
by Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), the inclusion of these additional covariates is
a way of checking whether alignment status is as good as randomly assigned
(conditional on f(MAi,t;ALi,t)) and it should not significantly aﬀect the
estimate of the alignment eﬀect. Finally, the last column reports the number
of observations.
Insert Table 5 about here
A common denominator to all these specifications is that the estimated ef-
fect of alignment on grants is always positive and generally highly significant.
In order to obtain more precise estimates on the magnitude of the alignment
eﬀect in Table A1 we report the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) as well
as p-values from the goodness-of-fit test (F-test), which provide formal guid-
ance on the choice of the best polynomial order.21 According to these criteria
the polynomial order that fits the data best is the fourth. Using the full sam-
ple, this means that a just aligned municipality should receive between 36%
and 47% more grants than a just unaligned one. The specifications with and
without controls produce very similar results and it is consistent with the
hypothesis that the use of the control function makes redundant the inclu-
sion of further controls. Also the magnitude of these coeﬃcients is in line
with the results obtained from the local linear regression model using an op-
timal bandwidth, which, in our case, restricts the sample to the observations
within ±13% MA. The estimated coeﬃcients for the local linear regression
model are indeed between 0.33 and 0.44. Moreover it is important to note
that RDD coeﬃcient estimates are more stable to the introduction of control
variables than OLS coeﬃcient estimates, showing that the control function
reduces the risk of biased estimates due to the problem of omitted variables.
If we consider only municipalities where the mayor was elected in the
second round the number of observations drops from 3141 to less than half
21Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), this is obtained by jointly testing the significance
of a set of bin dummies included as additional regressors in the model. The bin width
used to construct the bin dummies is 0.02. A bin width of 0.01 has not been used because
was generating to much collinearity in relation to the size of the sample.
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(1263), but the results remain very similar to the ones previously analyzed.
Note also that for this sub-sample, the margin of alignment is on average
smaller, as can be clearly seen from Table 4. Full summary statistics for the
sample of second round election are displayed in Table AA9 of the Online
Appendix.
Finally, in Table A3 of the Appendix, we show that the eﬀect of alignment
on grants is stronger at the end of the term, as predicted by the theoretical
model. In particular, in Table A3 we estimate the model (15) including, as an
additional regressor, the interaction between the alignment dummy and the
electoral cycle, defined in section 5.2, which records the number of years since
the last election in the municipality. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term
is positive and statistically significant. In the same table we also provide a
diﬀerent specification of the electoral cycle defined by a dummy for the last
year of the term. Again, the alignment eﬀect is stronger at the end of the
term. These last findings are in line with Brollo and Nannicini (2012).
Further analysis in support of the correctness of the procedure we im-
plement is provided in Figure A1 and Table A2. Using the McCrary (2008)
procedure, Figure A1 shows a graph of the distribution ofMA computed over
bins with a bandwidth of 0.01 (100 bins in the graph), along with a smooth
4th-order polynomial model.22 The graph shows no evidence of discontinuity
at the cutoﬀ. Therefore, there is no statistical evidence of manipulation of
the assignment variable around the cutoﬀ. Another important test for the
validity of the RD design is to examine whether the covariates do not ex-
hibit any discontinuity in relation to MA. As suggested by Lee and Lemieux
(2010) we test the null of discontinuities in all covariates simultaneously es-
timating a set of regressions where each covariate is a dependent variable,
and the explanatory variables are AL, and the polynomial in MA. This sys-
tem is estimated by Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), and then we
perform a chi-square test for joint hypothesis that AL is insignificant in all
regressions (zero discontinuity). As reported in Table A2 we cannot reject
the null hypothesis of zero discontinuity in all covariates in relation to almost
all polynomial orders of the margin of victory. Therefore, we can conclude
that there is no statistical evidence of discontinuity in the covariates.
22Higher order polynomial produce very similar results.
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7. The Turnover of Incumbents
7.1. Estimation Strategy
We now investigate our prediction that the probability of the incumbent
mayor being re-elected is higher when aligned with the central government.
To this, we estimate the following model:
Ii,e+1 = γ1ALi,e + f(MAi,e;ALi,e) + β
￿Xi,e + τe + µi + vi,e (16)
Note that the temporal unit is now election years, e. The outcome variable
is now Ii,e+1, which is equal to one if the winner of the local election at
time e+ 1 is the same (or at least belongs to the same party) as the winner
in the previous election (held at time e) and zero otherwise. As before,
f(MAi,e;ALi,e) is a polynomial function of up to fourth order in MAi,e,
where the coeﬃcients are interacted with ALi,e. The coeﬃcient of interest is
γ1, which is our alignment eﬀect on the probability of incumbent re-election;
γ1 should be interpreted as the diﬀerence between the (absolute) probability
of re-election of the aligned incumbent and the unaligned one. We expect γ1
to be positive.
The variable Ii,e+1 is calculated in two ways. First, we use a broad def-
inition of incumbent, incumbent party, under which Ii,e+1 is equal to 1 if
the winning mayor at elections held at time e + 1 in municipality i belongs
to the same coalition as the winner of the elections at time e; this is quite
consistent with the Italian case where usually the deputy mayor steps in
when the incumbent mayor cannot re-run for elections. Second, we consider
a narrower definition, incumbent candidate, where Ii,e+1 is equal to 1 only
if the incumbent mayor is re-elected for the second time at e + 1 and zero
otherwise. So under this definition we exclude all the cases where the mayor
cannot run because of term limits (there is a limit of two consecutive terms
for Italian mayors).
7.2. Graphical Analysis
Figures 3(a),(b) show the plots of the probability of re-election within
each bin against MA, the margin of alignment in the previous election. Fol-
lowing Lee and Lemieux (2010) we include 50 bins in all figures. We also
report the fitted values from a running-mean smoothing of the variable on
the vertical axis performed separately on each side of the cutoﬀ point (the
darker solid line) as well as the 95% confidence intervals (the two lighter
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lines). Both figures clearly show the “jump” in the probability of incumbent
re-election around the zero threshold. Note also that while the probability
of re-election for non-aligned mayors is strongly aﬀected by their popularity
(i.e. the margin of victory) in the previous elections, this is much less obvious
for aligned candidates. At the right hand side of Figure 3(b), the fitted poly-
nomial function is much flatter than the one displayed on the left hand side
of the figure. This is consistent with the fact that marginal aligned mayors,
facing potentially high probability of losing the election, receive extra help,
i.e. more grants, from the central government.
Insert Figure 3 about here
7.3. Regression Results
Table 6 below reports results for diﬀerent specifications of model (16),
using the above two definitions of incumbency. Note that the number of ob-
servations is now drastically reduced since we are only using election years;
for this reason, we display results only for the regressions where the full sam-
ple is employed.23 Note that in all specifications standard errors are clustered
at municipal level. Using the AIC reported in Table A1 in the Appendix,
the polynomial order that fits the data best is the second for both definitions
of incumbent, so we will base our discussion on this polynomial order. The
complete set of results related to other polynomial orders are reported in
Table AA2 of the Online Appendix. Now our RDD sample comprises 363
observations if we use the incumbent party definition for Ii,e+1 and 205 for
the incumbent candidate one. This relatively small number of observations
explains why, when we estimate the model using a high polynomial order,
the coeﬃcients tend to lose significance. The estimated coeﬃcients for the
incumbent eﬀect are between 0.20 and 0.31 (without and with controls) for
the incumbent party and between 0.25 and 0.35 for the incumbent candidate,
which means that being aligned with the central government at the time of
election gives local incumbents a strong advantage in comparison to non-
aligned ones. The inclusion of fixed and time eﬀects and controls does not
aﬀect the magnitude or the significance of the coeﬃcients.
23Regressions using only second round elections produce very similar results, but given
the reduced number of observations (127) standard errors are larger than when the full
sample is employed, and this obviously aﬀects the significance of the coeﬃcients. Output
for 2nd round elections is available upon request.
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Insert Table 6 about here
8. The Flypaper Eﬀect
The final step in our empirical analysis is to trace the eﬀect of political
alignment on taxes and expenditures via the grant. Following Knight (2002),
we estimate:
τi,t = αTi,t + β
￿Xi,t + ςt + µi + vi,t (17)
where τi,t is a measure of local tax revenue, as in the theoretical model. Also,
Xi,t includes all the control variables employed in previous regressions and
displayed in Table 4. Proposition 3 above suggests that 0 > α > −1. Of
course, Ti,t is endogenous, and our previous results suggest that we use the
alignment dummy ALi,t, as an instrument, which we know to be correlated
with Ti,t.
Tables 7 reports the main results for model (17). In Table 7, the depen-
dent variable is municipality core tax revenue, which comprises revenue from
the (ICI) and the personal income tax, the two main source of municipal tax
revenue. As a robustness check we also experiment with alternatives de-
pendent variables (see Tables AA10 and AA11 in the Online Appendix): (i)
municipality expenditures net of (national and regional) grants, i.e. revenues
from taxes and fees and (ii) municipality expenditures. In all specifications,
we report standard errors clustered at municipal level, which are robust for
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. We also include time dummies and
the full set of controls. Due to space constraints, the coeﬃcients on the con-
trols are not reported, with the exception of the per capita private sector
income (the variable “income per capita” in the tables), as this is needed for
the calculation of the flypaper eﬀect.24 Finally, municipality fixed eﬀects are
included in all specifications.
Let us discuss the results displayed in Table 7. The first column presents
the results when equation (17) is estimated by OLS and Ti,t is treated as ex-
ogenous; in the following columns we present results for the 2SLS when Ti,t is
instrumented with (i) the alignment dummy only; (ii) the alignment dummy
as well as the fourth order polynomial function in MA; (iii) the alignment
24This variable is defined as total income declared in the tax return minus real estate
income, since real estate income is used as a separate regressor to control for variation in
the tax base of the property tax.
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dummy, and the first order polynomial function in MA, and we restrict the
sample to those observations falling within the optimal bandwidth employed
in the local linear regression on grants above. For the 2SLS specifications,
we include first and second stage regression outputs.
Insert Table 7 about here
When grants are not instrumented (column 1) our results suggest that an
increase of 1 Euro per capita in grants reduces local taxes by 0.167 Euros,
which means that there is an increase of overall public spending of about 0.83
Euros per capita. By contrast, conditional on the grant, a 1 Euro per capita
increase in private income has no eﬀect on public spending. The flypaper
eﬀect can be then measured as the diﬀerence between one plus the coeﬃcient
on the grant, and the coeﬃcient on private income. So when grants are not
instrumented, the flypaper eﬀect in Italian municipalities is calculated to be
around 83% percent (1-0.169=0.83).
However the tests reported at the bottom of Table 7 indicate that the
grants are endogenous (Hausman test) and that the alignment dummy is a
good instrument for it (Sargan-Hansen test), so in the following column of
the table we report results for IV estimation. When grants are instrumented
(column 2 ) with the alignment dummy, the coeﬃcient on grants becomes
now -0.571, and it is significant at 1%. Private income per capita becomes
significantly positive; however, the size of the eﬀect is very small (a 1 Euro
increase in private income gives at most a 1 cent increase in core tax revenue).
Overall the extent of the flypaper eﬀect decreases, going down to 0.43% (i.e.
1+(-0.571+0.006)). This means that public spending increases of about 0.43
Euros per capita for each Euro increase in grants. This estimate is almost
unchanged when we add a fourth-order polynomial in MA as an additional
instrument in column 3.
The Sargan-Hansen test displayed at the bottom of the panel suggests
that the excluded instruments are valid instruments. Moreover in both cases,
an F-statistic on the significance of the first stage regressor is very large,
suggesting that weak instruments are not a problem (Staiger and Stock,
1997). Finally, in the last column (column 4), we restrict the analysis to
those municipalities whose margin of alignment in previous mayoral elections
was within the optimal bandwidth (i.e. a value ofMA ±0.13%). The sample
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shrinks from 3527 observations to 837. The estimated coeﬃcient on the grant
is now -0.55.
So, overall, the flypaper eﬀect is estimated to be between 43% and 48%.
This estimate is in line with other studies in the survey by Inman (2008). In
particular, Inman finds that across a large number of studies, the flypaper
eﬀect ranges from about 0.25 to 1.00. It is worth noting that our finding
(namely, that instrumenting decreases the flypaper eﬀect) is similar to what
is found in Knight (2002).
In order to test the validity of our results with respect to diﬀerent mea-
sures of τi,t, we re-run model (17) using municipality expenditures net of
(national and regional) grants (which is equivalent to revenues from taxes
and fees) as the dependent variable. Table AA10, included in the Online
Appendix, displays the results for this exercise. In Table AA11 we displayed
the results for the estimation of model (17) using municipality expenditures
as dependent variable. This specification has been usually employed in the
past to investigate the extent of the flypaper eﬀect. For both cases the results
are consistent with those displayed in Table 7.
9. Conclusions
This paper has explored both theoretically and empirically the eﬀect of
political alignment on local public finance and elections. Our model predicts
that aligned jurisdictions are assigned more grants by the central government
because a higher grant to aligned mayors (because not directly observed
by voters) signals higher competence of that mayor and thus increases the
probability of their re-election. Moreover, the model shows that part of
the extra grants will be used to reduce taxes, and part to increase local
expenditure, implying a flypaper eﬀect.
We test these predictions using a new data set on Italian local public
finance and elections over the 1998-2010 period. Our empirical strategy is
based on regression discontinuity design (RDD), exploiting the fact that be-
ing or not aligned with the central government changes discontinuously at
50% of the votes at local election. Moreover, the RDD approach also provides
a good identification strategy to estimate the relationship between grants and
expenditure providing an unbiased measure of the flypaper eﬀect.
Our empirical results are largely consistent with our theoretical predic-
tions. In particular we find that, if a municipality is politically aligned with
the party in power at the central level, it will be rewarded with an increase
29
in grants between 36% and 47%; moreover, the probability of re-election of
aligned municipalities will be between 20% and 35% higher than for non-
aligned local governments. Finally, we find a positive flypaper eﬀect; 40% of
each Euro of extra grants will be used to increase expenditure and 60% will
be used, instead, to reduce local taxes.
The theoretical and the empirical analysis showed, in the end, that when
local governments are responsible for the provision of local public goods, there
is a perverse trade-oﬀ between the level of discretion in the distribution of
intergovernmental grants and the disciplining and selection role of elections.
In fact if grants are not formula-based and voters attribute, correctly, most of
the credit for providing local public goods to the local government, then the
central government will tend to divert resources toward aligned jurisdictions
for electoral purposes, thus generating an ineﬃcient allocation of resources.
So, our analysis provides another reason why formula-based grants are to be
preferred to discretionary ones.
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Figures
Figure 1. Yearly distribution of municipalities by winning coalitions
Notes: electoral data covers the 1998-­2008 period, however we retain in the dataset municipalities without
mayoral election between in 2009 and 2010. The (un)shaded areas refer to years when a central-­left (right)
government was in power.
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Figure 2. Grants
(a) -­ all sample
(b) – optimal bandwidth
Notes. The central line split the polynomial functions in the margin of alignment fitted
over the interval [-­40, +40] in panel (a), and over the optimal bandwidth in panel (b).
The lateral lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged
over 2-­unit intervals.
Figure 3. Probability of re-­election
(a) – party incumbent
(b) – candidate incumbent
Notes. The central line split the polynomial function in the margin of alignment fitted over the
interval [-­40, +40]. The lateral lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Scatter points are
averaged over 2-­unit intervals.
Figure A1. Density of the forcing variable
Notes. The figure shows a graph of the raw densities computed over bins with a bandwidth
of 0.01 (100 bins in the graph), along with a smooth 4th-­order polynomial model.
Table 1. Party affiliation of mayors in all elections (1998-­2008)
All municipalities Only < 15000 Only > 15000
No. % No. % No. %
Center-­left 20,641 23.69 16,588 20.68 4,053 58.54
Center-­right 13,413 15.39 10,924 13.62 2,489 35.95
Independents (Lista civica) 53,015 60.84 52,639 65.62 376 5.43
Missing 75 0.09 70 0.09 5 0.07
Total 87,144 80,221 6,923
Note. The table reports statistics on mayors’ party affiliation on annual basis for
the period 1998-­2008.
Table 2. Distribution of elections by aligned and non-­aligned municipalities
(regression sample)
year
Aligned Not Aligned Total
Center-­right Center-­left Total Center-­right Center-­left
Tota
l election
1998 0 23 23 21 0 21 44
1999 0 122 122 47 0 47 169
2000 0 26 26 19 0 19 45
2001 47 0 47 0 42 42 89
2002 59 0 59 0 68 68 127
2003 17 0 17 0 29 29 46
2004 43 0 43 0 144 144 187
2005 18 0 18 0 45 45 63
2006 0 62 62 44 0 44 106
2007 0 42 42 75 0 75 117
2008 34 0 34 0 23 23 57
Total 218 275 493 206 351 557 1050
Table 3. Descriptive statistics, observations in the regression sample
All
sample
MV
< 5%
MV
< 2%
Aligned 2,312 265 116
Not Aligned 2,447 271 105
Total 4,759 536 221
Table 4. Descriptive statistics, means and standard deviations by margin of alignment
(regression sample)
Mean Std. Dev.
All
sample
MV
< 5%
MV
< 2%
All
sample
MV
< 5%
MV
< 2%
Current grants from central
government, real euro per-­capita 154.71 162.65 152.17 91.88 92.98 91.79
Current grants from regional
government, real euro per-­capita 45.56 47.26 46.45 41.24 46.08 52.83
Total municipal taxes (property +
income tax) -­ real euro per capita 243.96 229.20 250.72 85.63 79.75 69.77
Current municipal fees
real euro per-­capita 268.55 257.54 274.12 142.00 134.68 149.02
Current municipal expenditure
real euro per-­capita 790.57 764.97 797.97 203.71 202.18 183.81
1 = if incumbent mayor is re-­elected 0.7896 0.6521 0.5010 0.4078 0.4797 0.5107
1 = if incumbent party is re-­elected 0.8028 0.6782 0.5294 0.3982 0.4699 0.5066
1 = if mayor elected at the second
round 0.4406 0.9085 0.9049 0.4965 0.2884 0.2939
Margin of victory, municipal election 21.82 2.53 1.02 14.96 1.47 0.54
1 = if municipality is aligned with the
central government 0.4858 0.4944 0.5249 0.4999 0.5004 0.5005
1 = if municipality is aligned with the
regional government 0.5999 0.4384 0.5294 0.4899 0.4966 0.5000
Resident population 55,292 76,601 48,489 151,946 273,192 68,768
Percentage of residents under15 years
old 14.57 15.05 14.11 3.17 3.64 2.87
Percentage of residents over 65 years
old 17.54 16.90 17.96 4.53 4.49 4.26
Income different form real estate, real
euro per-­capita 16,851 16,873 17,590 3,263 3,409 3,083
Income from real estate, real euro per-­
capita 1,777 1,769 1,821 521 514 551
Electoral cycle (0 = election year,
4 = year before election) 1.84 1.84 1.77 1.37 1.38 1.37
Local government dummy
(1 = left council) 0.6090 0.4683 0.4661 0.4880 0.4995 0.5000
Central government dummy
(1 = left central government) 0.3137 0.3060 0.2805 0.4641 0.4612 0.4503
Note. Number of observations: All sample = 4,759;; MV < 5% =536;; MV < 5% = 221.
Table 5. Political alignment and grant allocation
Regression specifications NoControls
With
Controls
With controls &
Fixed Effect Observations
OLS regression (all
sample) 0.555*** 0.138*** 0.134*** 3546
(0.0324) (0.0218) (0.0314)
OLS regression (all
sample, 2nd round) 0.386*** 0.143*** 0.131*** 1431
(0.0523) (0.0343) (0.0444)
Fourth order polynomial
(RD Sample) 0.475*** 0.364*** 0.365*** 3141
(0.157) -­0.105 (0.137)
Fourth order polynomial
(RD Sample, 2nd round) 0.713*** 0.588*** 0.523*** 1263
(0.219) (0.147) (0.195)
Local Linear regression
(h) 0.326*** 0.403*** 0.439*** 856
(0.120) (0.121) (0.0930)
Local linear regression
(half h) 0.174 0.449** 0.301** 324
(0.183) (0.182) (0.137)
Local linear regression
(double h) 0.319*** 0.348*** 0.303*** 1750
(0.0792) (0.0838) (0.0643)
Notes. The table reports coefficients on alignment dummies. RD sample included all municipal elections where
the winner and the runner up belong to the centre-­left and centre-­right coalition. Controls include: municipal
population and population squared, income per capita, income per capita from real estate, proportion of
population under 14 and over 65 years old. Time dummies are included in all regressions in columns 2 and 3.
Optimally chosen bandwidth (h) in local linear regressions is +/-­13. Significance at 1% is represented by *** , at
5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal level. The number of
observations drops from 3546 to 3141 because the lagged margin of victory is missing for the first year of the
dataset since we do not have election data for the year 1997.
Table 6. Alignment and the probability of incumbent re-­election
Coefficient on
Alignment
Panel 1: Incumbent Party
Obs.
Panel 2: Incumbent Candidate
Obs.No
controls Controls
Controls
& FE
No
controls Controls
Controls
& FE
Linear regression 0.0279 0.144*** 0.156*** 768 0.156*** 0.119*** 0.128*** 641
(0.0275) (0.0378) (0.0359) (0.0373) (0.0433) (0.042)
Second order
polynomial (RD Sample)
0.208 0.312*** 0.267*** 363 0.358** 0.314** 0.256* 205
(0.130) (0.101) (0.101) (0.140) (0.134) (0.141)
Local Linear regression
(h)
0.759** 0.521 26 0.623* 0.119 22
(0.356) (0.468) (0.357) (0.428)
Local linear regression
(half h)
0.840** 0.838 17 0.714 0.778 15
(0.387) (0.828) (0.470) (0.631)
Local linear regression
(double h)
0.631** 0.715** 42 0.611* 0.303 33
(0.290) (0.356) (0.300) (0.282)
Notes. The table reports coefficients on alignment dummies. RD sample included all municipal elections where the winner and the
runner up belong to the centre-­left and centre-­right coalition. Controls include: municipal population and population squared,
income per capita, income per capita from real estate, proportion of population under 14 and over 65 years old. Time dummies are
included in all regressions in columns 2 and 3, 5 and 6. Optimally chosen bandwidth (h) in local linear regressions is +/-­3.5%.
Significance at 1% is represented by *** , at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal
level. The number of observations drops from 641 to 205 because the lagged margin of victory is missing for the first year of the
dataset since we do not have election data for the year 1997.
Table 7-­ Testing for flypaper effect, determination of municipal taxes (Euros per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(baseline model) (polynomial instruments) (optimal bandwidth)
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Dependent Taxes Grants Taxes Grants Taxes Grants Taxes
Variable
Grant -­0.167*** -­0.571*** -­0.526*** -­0.535***
(0.0181) (0.0834) (0.056) (0.076)
Income (per capita) 0.001 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.023*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Alignment dummy 12.73*** 41.86*** 22.28***
(1.368) (7.377) (6.427)
MA (fourth order polynomial) no yes no
MA (first order polynomial) no no yes
Observations 3527 3527 3527 3122 3122 837 837
R-­squared 0.424
F-­test on joint significance covariates
(F-­statistics) 86.59 19.22 32.24
Sargan-­Hansen statistic Chi-­sq (8) 4.757 (2) 0.360
Ho: valid excluded instrument (p-­value) 0.783 0.835
Hausman test (Prob>chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Municipality Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes. Significance at 1% is represented by *** , at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal level.
Controls include: Resident population, Percentage of residents under15 years old, Percentage of residents over 65 years old, Electoral cycle, Local government dummy (1 = left
council), Central government dummy (1 = left central government), Municipal alignment with the regional government dummy (1 = aligned municipality), Current grants from
regional government (real euro per-­capita).
Table A1. AIC and Goodness of Fit tests for grants and Incumbent regressions
Polynomial
Grade
Grants Incumbent(Party)
Incumbent
(Candidate)
F-­test AIC F-­test AIC F-­test AIC
0 0.0883 3450.742 0.0969 596.109 0.5605 56.384
1 0.2128 3451.338 0.3802 599.719 0.5576 59.812
2 0.2322 3451.204 0.7173 603.011 0.6727 63.411
3 0.2866 3454.528 0.7893 605.798 0.7333 67.104
4 0.2563 3448.634 0.9586 606.434 0.9156 69.986
5 0.2345 3451.392 0.9388 599.423 0.8051 65.674
6 0.3804 3448.036 0.9226 595.748 0.8230 63.592
Table A2. Testing for the continuity of the covariates in close elections
Polynomial
Grade Chi2(12) Prob > Chi2
0 27.18 0.0073
1 17.27 0.1396
2 16.89 0.1538
3 26.3 0.0097
4 20.87 0.0523
5 15.55 0.2127
6 15.57 0.2115
Notes. The table reports chi-­square tests for the discontinuity gaps to examine whether the
covariates in the RD do not exhibit any discontinuity in relation to the margin of
alignment. As suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010) we test the null of discontinuities in
all covariates simultaneously estimating a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) where
each equation represents a different baseline covariate.
Table A3. Testing the interaction between alignment and electoral cycle on grants
OLS regression
Fourth polynomial
order
(RD sample)
alignment dummy 0.087** 0.089** 0.311** 0.329**
(0.039) (0.036) (0.139) (0.144)
Electoral cycle 0.005 0.006
(0.012) (0.012)
Alignment dummy 0.025* 0.027*
X Electoral cycle (0.013) (0.015)
Electoral cycle 2 -­0.009 -­0.002
(0.045) (0.045)
Alignment dummy 0.110** 0.109*
X Electoral cycle 2 (0.055) (0.056)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3546 3546 3141 3141
Notes. Significance at 1% is represented by *** , at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in
brackets clustered at municipal level. Here, “e” denotes election year. Electoral cycle 2 is a dummy = 1 in
year before election only. In columns 3 and 4, the number of observations drops from 3546 to 3141
because the lagged margin of victory is missing for the first year of the dataset since we do not have
election data for the year 1997.
Online Appendix
Second-Period Equilibrium and Derivation of the Continuation Value
V
In the second period, the incumbent politician in i chooses τi, ei to max-
imize
λ(f(τi + Ti) + ei + a
e
i − d(τi))− ψ(ei) (AA.1)
taking Ti as given, where aei is the expected value of ai conditional on the
incumbent’s information set at the beginning of period 2. If the period 1
incumbent wins the election, he has enough information to calculate ai i.e.
aei = ai, but if the challenger wins the election, a
e
i = 0. The first-order
conditions are
λ = ψ￿(ei), f ￿(τi + Ti) = d￿(τi) (AA.2)
At the same time, the national government chooses Ti to maximize￿
i∈M
λ(f(τi + Ti) + ei + a
e
i − d(τi))−
￿
i∈M
Ti
taking τi, ei as given. So, at equilibrium, the first-order conditions with
respect to Ti are
λf ￿(τi + Ti) = 1, i ∈M (AA.3)
Clearly, all these first-order conditions are identical across municipalities.
We assume for convenience that conditions (AA.2),(AA.3) have the unique
solution τˆ , eˆ, Tˆ . Then, from (AA.1) and aei = ai, the continuation value to
the incumbent of winning the election, from the perspective of the beginning
of period 2, is
λ(f(τˆ + Tˆ ) + eˆ+ ai − d(τˆ))− ψ(eˆ) ≡ V + λai
Now, at the time of choosing policy before the election in period 1, neither
the incumbent in i nor the national government have observed ai, or any
variable correlated with it, so their expectation of the continuation value is
simply V.
Proof of Proposition 1. First, note that Ti, τi, ei are determined inde-
pendently from Tj, τj, ej for any two municipalities i and j. Moreover, the
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first-order condition for ei is independent of the remaining first-order condi-
tions. So, the conditions determining Ti, τi can be written
(λ+B)f ￿(τi + Ti) = Ψ￿(Ti) (AA.4)
f ￿(τi + Ti) = d￿(τi) (AA.5)
where
B = xζi − (1− x)ζi
and where x = 1 if i ∈ MA, x = 0 if i ∈ MN . Totally diﬀerentiating
(AA.4)-(AA.5), by Cramer’s rule, we get:
dTi
dB
=
￿￿￿￿ −f ￿ (λ+B)f ￿￿0 f ￿￿ − d￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (λ+B)f ￿￿ (λ+B)f ￿￿f ￿￿ f ￿￿ − d￿￿
￿￿￿￿ =
−f ￿(f ￿￿ − d￿￿)
D
(AA.6)
where D = d￿￿−f ￿￿(λ+B)d￿￿ > 0 from f ￿￿ < 0, d￿￿ > 0. So, consequently, from
(AA.6), dTdB > 0. So, as B = ζi if i is aligned, and B = −ζj if j is non-aligned,
then Ti > Tj. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. We need to show that for any two munic-
ipalities i, j where i is aligned and j is not, that expected voter utility is
higher in i, because then the retrospective voter is more likely to vote for the
incumbent in i. Expected first-period voter utility in i is
f(τi + Ti) + ei − d(τi)
Note first from Proposition 1 that Ti > Tj, and from Proposition 3, as τi
falls less than one for one with an increase in Ti, τi + Ti will be higher also.
Next, note that from Proposition 1-3, τi is lower when aligned i.e. τi < τj, so
d(τi) < d(τj). Finally, as ei is increasing in ζi, and unaﬀected by Ti, ζi ≥ ζj
ensures ei ≥ ej. So, putting all this together,
f(τi + Ti) + ei − d(τi) > f(τj + Tj) + ej − d(τj)
as required. ￿
Insert Table AA1-AA11 about here
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Table AA1. Political alignment and grant allocation
Regression specifications NoControls
With
Controls
With controls &
Fixed Effect Observations
OLS regression (all
sample) 0.555*** 0.138*** 0.134*** 3546
(0.0324) (0.0218) (0.0314)
OLS regression (all
sample, 2nd round) 0.386*** 0.143*** 0.131*** 1431
(0.0523) (0.0343) (0.0444)
First order polynomial
(RD Sample) 0.263*** 0.257*** 0.265*** 3141
(0.0663) (0.044) (0.0572)
Second order polynomial
(RD Sample) 0.462*** 0.323*** 0.289*** 3141
(0.099) (0.0652) (0.0816)
Third order polynomial
(RD Sample) 0.571*** 0.414*** 0.432*** 3141
(0.128) (0.085) (0.108)
Fourth order polynomial
(RD Sample) 0.475*** 0.364*** 0.365*** 3141
(0.157) -­0.105 (0.137)
First order polynomial
(RD Sample, 2nd round ) 0.280** 0.333*** 0.335*** 1263
(0.112) (0.0718) (0.0852)
Second order polynomial
(RD Sample, 2nd round) 0.124 0.289*** 0.254** 1263
(0.148) (0.0957) (0.117)
Third order polynomial
(RD Sample, 2nd round) 0.423** 0.499*** 0.405*** 1263
(0.185) (0.119) (0.151)
Fourth order polynomial
(RD Sample, 2nd round) 0.713*** 0.588*** 0.523*** 1263
(0.219) (0.147) (0.195)
Local Linear regression
(h) 0.326*** 0.403*** 0.439*** 856
(0.120) (0.121) (0.0930)
Local linear regression
(half h) 0.174 0.449** 0.301** 324
(0.183) (0.182) (0.137)
Local linear regression
(double h) 0.319*** 0.348*** 0.303*** 1750
(0.0792) (0.0838) (0.0643)
Notes. The table reports coefficients on alignment dummies. RD sample included all municipal elections where
the winner and the runner up belong to the centre-­left and centre-­right coalition. Controls include: municipal
population and population squared, income per capita, income per capita from real estate, proportion of
population under 14 and over 65 years old. Time dummies are included in all regressions in columns 2 and 3.
Optimally chosen bandwidth (h) in local linear regressions is +/-­13. Significance at 1% is represented by *** ,
at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal level.
Table AA2. Alignment and the probability of incumbent re-­election
Coefficient on
Alignment
Panel 1: Incumbent Party
Obs.
Panel 2: Incumbent Candidate
Obs.No
controls Controls
Controls
& FE
No
controls Controls
Controls
& FE
Linear regression 0.0279 0.144*** 0.156*** 768 0.156*** 0.119*** 0.128*** 641
(0.0275) (0.0378) (0.0359) (0.0373) (0.0433) (0.042)
First order polynomial 0.135 0.240*** 0.189*** 363 0.303*** 0.265*** 0.191* 205
(0.0845) (0.0641) (0.0648) (0.0960) (0.0933) (0.101)
Second order
polynomial (RD Sample) 0.208 0.312*** 0.267*** 363 0.358** 0.314** 0.256* 205
(0.130) (0.101) (0.101) (0.140) (0.134) (0.141)
Third order polynomial
(RD Sample) 0.403** 0.403*** 0.335** 363 0.581*** 0.513*** 0.411** 205
(0.165) (0.134) (0.136) (0.179) (0.172) (0.186)
Fourth order polynomial
(RD Sample) 0.337 0.334* 0.287 363 0.555*** 0.423* 0.352 205
(0.209) (0.177) (0.184) (0.210) (0.215) (0.222)
Local Linear regression
(h) 0.759** 0.521 26 0.623* 0.119 22
(0.356) (0.468) (0.357) (0.428)
Local linear regression
(half h) 0.840** 0.838 17 0.714 0.778 15
(0.387) (0.828) (0.470) (0.631)
Local linear regression
(double h) 0.631** 0.715** 42 0.611* 0.303 33
(0.290) (0.356) (0.300) (0.282)
Notes. The table reports coefficients on alignment dummies. RD sample included all municipal elections where the winner and
the runner up belong to the centre-­left and centre-­right coalition. Controls include: municipal population and population
squared, income per capita, income per capita from real estate, proportion of population under 14 and over 65 years old. Time
dummies are included in all regressions in columns 2 and 3, 5 and 6. Optimally chosen bandwidth (h) in local linear
regressions is +/-­3.5%. Significance at 1% is represented by *** , at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in
brackets clustered at municipal level.
Table AA3. Descriptive statistics, means and differences in means between aligned and
non-­aligned (regression sample)
Aligned NotAligned Diff.
P-­value
?????????????
Current grants from central government, real euro
per-­capita 177.42 132.50 44.92 0.0000
Current grants from regional government, real
euro per-­capita 44.33 46.86 -­2.53 0.1125
Total municipal taxes (property + income tax), real
euro per capita 236.88 250.85 -­13.97 0.0000
Current municipal fees real euro per-­capita 274.06 262.76 11.3 0.3266
Current municipal expenditure
real euro per-­capita 792. 8 788.88 3.400 0.3336
1 = if incumbent mayor is re-­elected 0.7827 0.7945 -­0.011 0.7184
1 = if incumbent party is re-­elected 0.7961 0.8098 -­0.013 0.9095
1 = if mayor elected at the second round 0.4403 0.4409 -­0.000 0.9647
Margin of victory, municipal elections 21.71 21.94 -­0.230 0.9746
1 = if municipality is aligned with the regional
government 0.6111 0.5880 0.0231 0.0809
Resident population 53,804 56,862 -­3,058 0.4200
Percentage of residents under15 years old 14.63 14.50 0.130 0.0114
Percentage of residents over 65 years old 17.42 17.68 -­0.260 0.0038
Income different form real estate, real euro per-­
capita 16,786 16,919 -­133 0.2338
Income from real estate, real euro per-­capita 1,779 1,775 4.000 0.8669
Municipal electoral cycle (0 = election year,
4 = year before election) 1.80 1.87 -­0.070 0.1343
Local government dummy
(1 = left council) 0.4928 0.7314 -­0.238 0.0000
Central government dummy
(1 = left central government) 0.3578 0.2673 0.090 0.0002
Table AA4. Political classification of parties (1998-­2008)
Center-­Left No. Center-­Right No. Independents No.
CEN-­SIN(LS.CIVICHE) 2,565 CEN-­DES(LS.CIVICHE) 1,245 LISTA CIVICA 265
CEN-­SIN 629 CEN-­DES 403 IND 57
DEMOCRATICI SINISTRA 246 FORZA ITALIA 251 SVP 20
PDS 193 LEGA NORD 181 UV 7
SINISTRA 140 CENTRO 127 PATTO SEGNI 6
L'ULIVO 84 ALLEANZA NAZIONALE 87 DEMOCRAZIA EUROPEA 5
P.POPOLARE ITALIANO 39 POLO PER LE LIBERTA' 30 MOV. PER L'AUTONOMIA 5
PPI (POP) 27 CCD 26 RINNOV.IT-­ALTRI 5
DL.LA MARGHERITA 18 CASA DELLE LIBERTA' 17 SI 4
RIF.COM. 17 CDU 14 LISTA LOCALE 1
LA MARGHERITA 16 IL POPOLO DELLA LIBE 13 PRI 1
PROGRESSISTI (1994) 8 LEGA LOMB-­LEGA NORD 10
CEN-­SIN(CONTR.UFF.) 7 LG.NORD-­LG.VENETA 10
PARTITO DEMOCRATICO 7 L.VEN-­L.NORD 9
POPOLARI 6 LISTA CIVICA 9
IND.SIN. 5 UDC 9
PER VERONA 5 CCD-­CDU 7
PROGRESSISTI SALERNO 5 DESTRA 7
SDI-­ALTRI 5 FI-­CCD 5
FED.DEI VERDI 4 FI-­CCD-­AN 5
UNITI NELL'ULIVO 4 POLO BUON GOVERNO 5
ALL. DI PROGRESSO 3 CDL 4
CENSIN 3 CENDES 4
I DEMOCRATICI 3 LG.VENETA REPUBBLICA 4
LA MARG. 2 U.D.EUR 3
SDI 2 U.D.EUR POPOLARI 1
SOCIALISTIALTRI 2 FI-­CCD-­CDU 1
U.D.EUR 2 FORZA IT.-­POLO POP. 1
U.D.EUR POPOLARI 2 PDL 1
P.DEM. 1
PATTO DEMOCRATICI 1
POPOLARI-­CIVICA 1
VERDI 1
TOTAL 4,053 2,489 376
Notes: Frequencies record the number of elected mayors in large municipalities classified as supported by each party.
U.D.EUR and U.D.EUR POPOLARI are classified as a Center-­Left party for the years 2006-­2008 when they supported the
center-­left government.
Table AA5. Large municipalities
years
Large
municipalities
as % of total
municipalities
% of residents in
large
municipalities
% of total grants to
large municipalities
2002 9.41% 60.87% 65.97%
2003 9.41% 60.86% 64.93%
2004 9.41% 60.99% 65.55%
2005 9.41% 60.80% 66.23%
2006 9.41% 60.84% 65.98%
2007 9.41% 60.65% 68.86%
2008 9.41% 60.55% 70.64%
2009 9.41% 60.50% 70.49%
2010 9.41% 60.54% 69.33%
2011 9.41% 60.23% 68.90%
Table AA6. Distribution of elections by first round and second round
(regression sample)
year
First round Second round Total
electionCenter-­right
wins
Center-­left
wins Total
Center-­right
wins
Center-­left
wins Total
1998 4 12 16 17 11 28 44
1999 13 84 97 34 38 72 169
2000 7 10 17 12 16 28 45
2001 22 17 39 25 25 50 89
2002 40 34 74 19 34 53 127
2003 11 15 26 6 14 20 46
2004 16 105 121 27 39 66 187
2005 15 24 39 3 21 24 63
2006 27 39 66 17 23 40 106
2007 40 23 63 35 19 54 117
2008 14 7 21 20 16 36 57
Total 209 370 579 215 256 471 1050
Table AA7. Local elections by coalition and margin of victory (regression sample)
year
All sample MV < 5% MV < 2%
Center-­right
wins
Center-­left
wins
Center-­right
wins
Center-­left
wins
Center-­right
wins
Center-­left
wins
1998 21 23 3 1 0 0
1999 47 122 12 10 4 3
2000 19 26 2 4 2 1
2001 47 42 4 6 1 1
2002 59 68 7 8 5 4
2003 17 29 1 1 0 1
2004 43 144 12 8 7 5
2005 18 45 3 5 1 3
2006 44 62 8 5 1 2
2007 75 42 6 4 3 1
2008 34 23 4 3 4 2
Total 424 626 62 55 28 23
Table AA8. Local elections by coalition and alignment status (regression sample)
year
All sample MV < 5% MV < 2%
Aligned Not-­Aligned Aligned Not-­Aligned Aligned Not-­Aligned
1998 21 23 3 1 0 0
1999 47 122 12 10 4 3
2000 19 26 2 4 2 1
2001 42 47 6 4 1 1
2002 68 59 8 7 4 5
2003 29 17 1 1 1 0
2004 144 43 8 12 5 7
2005 45 18 5 3 3 1
2006 44 62 8 5 1 2
2007 75 42 6 4 3 1
2008 23 34 3 4 2 4
Total 557 493 62 55 26 25
Table AA9. Descriptive statistics, means and standard deviations by margin of alignment,
second round elections, (regression sample)
Mean Std. Dev.
All
sample
MV
< 5%
MV
< 2%
All
sample
MV
< 5%
MV
< 2%
Current grants from central
government, real euro per-­capita 155.88 161.84 151.94 92.12 90.90 91.13
Current grants from regional
government, real euro per-­capita 46.66 48.52 48.76 46.07 46.82 54.35
Total municipal taxes (property +
income tax) -­ real euro per capita 229.54 232.40 251.87 80.05 79.15 69.92
Current municipal fees real euro per-­
capita 258.33 258.69 279.58 133.63 134.87 149.21
Current municipal expenditure
real euro per-­capita 755.15 767.51 808.89 190.85 201.26 185.98
1 = if incumbent mayor is re-­elected 0.6703 0.6250 0.4545 0.4710 0.4880 0.5096
1 = if incumbent party is re-­elected 0.6778 0.6456 0.4839 0.4680 0.4814 0.5080
Margin of victory, municipal election 12.4520 3.8259 3.3667 9.6211 5.0825 7.0532
1 = if municipality is aligned with the
central government 0.4855 0.5010 0.5450 0.4999 0.5005 0.4992
1 = if municipality is aligned with the
regional government 0.4854 0.5010 0.5400 0.4999 0.5005 0.4992
Resident population 52,574 67,797 49,734 174,964 257,521 71,367
Percentage of residents under15 years
old 15.04 14.83 13.91 3.13 3.30 2.49
Percentage of residents over 65 years
old 16.79 17.03 18.04 4.32 4.22 3.93
Income different form real estate real
euro per-­capita 16,713 16,994 18,056 3,323 3,168 2,770
Income from real estate, real euro per-­
capita 1,743 1,756 1,852 514 511 556
Electoral cycle (0 = election year,
4 = year before election) 1.804 1.844 1.775 1.361 1.376 1.365
Local government dummy
(1 = left council) 0.5513 0.4723 0.4350 0.4975 0.4997 0.4970
Central government dummy
(1 = left central government) 0.3019 0.3018 0.2800 0.4592 0.4595 0.4501
Number of observations: All sample = 2,097 MV < 5% =487 MV < 5% = 200
Table AA10. Testing for flypaper effect, determination of current expenditures net of grants from central government and regional
governments (Euros per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(baseline model) (polynomial instruments) (optimal bandwidth)
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Dependent Net Grants Net Grants Net Grants Net
Variable
Expenditur
e Expenditure Expenditure Expend.
Grant -­0.858*** -­0.638*** -­0.623*** -­0.405***
(0.047) (0.212) (0.140) (0.185)
Income (per capita) -­0.003 0.012*** -­0.006 0.013*** -­0.006 0.023*** -­0.011
(0.007) (0.002) (-­0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Alignment dummy 12.86*** 42.53*** 23.99***
(1.365) (6.911) (5.92)
MA (fourth order polynomial) no yes no
MA (first order polynomial) no no yes
Observations 3546 3546 3546 3141 3141 856 856
R-­squared 0.432
F-­test on joint significance covariates
(F-­statistics) 88.74 19.92 34.14
Sargan-­Hansen statistic Chi-­sq (8) 15.40 (2) 4.259
Ho: valid excluded instrument (p-­
value) 0.051 0.118
Hausman test (Prob>chi2) 0.016 0.016 0.000
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Municipality Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes. Significance at 1% is represented by *** , at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal level.
Controls include: Resident population, Percentage of residents under15 years old, Percentage of residents over 65 years old, Electoral cycle, Local government
dummy (1 = left council), Central government dummy (1 = left central government), Municipal alignment with the regional government dummy (1 = aligned
municipality), Current grants from regional government (real euro per-­capita).
Table AA11. Testing for flypaper effect, determination of current expenditures (Euros per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(baseline model) (polynomial instrument) (optimal bandwidth)
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Dependent Current Grants Current Grants Current Grants Current
Variable Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures
Grant 0.142*** 0.362* 0.377*** 0.595***
(0.0478) (0.211) (0.140) (0.185)
Income (per capita) -­0.00374 0.011*** -­0.00631 0.013*** -­0.006 0.023*** -­0.011
(0.00770) (0.002) (0.00497) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.048)
Alignment dummy 12.92*** 42.53*** 23.99***
(1.27) (6.91) (5.92)
MA (fourth order polynomial) no yes no
MA (first order polynomial) no no yes
Observations 3546 3546 3546 3141 3141 856 856
R-­squared 0.149
F-­test on joint significance covariates
(F-­statistics) 88.74 19.92 34.14
Sargan-­Hansen statistic Chi-­sq (8) 15.40 (2) 4.29
Ho: valid excluded instrument (p-­
value) 0.051 0.118
Hausman test (Prob>chi2) 0.034 0.034 0.000
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Municipality Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes. Significance at 1% is represented by *** , at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal level.
Controls include: Resident population, Percentage of residents under15 years old, Percentage of residents over 65 years old, Electoral cycle, Local
government dummy (1 = left council), Central government dummy (1 = left central government), municipal alignment with the regional government dummy
(1 = aligned municipality), Current grants from regional government (real euro per-­capita).
